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Some think that life is worth living not merely because of the goods and the 
bads within it, but also because life itself is good. I explain how this idea can be 
formalized by associating each version of the view with a function from length of 
life to the value generated by life itself. Then I argue that every version of the view 
that life itself is good faces some version of the following dilemma: either (1) good 
human lives are worse than very long lives wholly devoid of pleasure, desire-satis-
faction, knowledge, or any other goods, or (2) very short lives containing nothing 
but suffering are worth living. Since neither result is plausible, we ought to reject 
the view that life itself is good. On the view I favor, any given life may be worth 












Some philosophers think the goodness of a life is determined not only by the 
goods within that life, but also by the fact that life itself is good: 
 
There are elements which, if added to one’s experience, make life better; there 
are other elements which…make life worse. But what remains when these are 
set aside is not merely neutral: it is emphatically positive. Therefore life is worth 
living even when the bad elements of experience are plentiful, and the good 
ones too meager to outweigh the bad ones on their own. The additional positive 
weight is supplied by experience itself. (Nagel 1970: 2) 
 
On this picture, even after counting all the goodness and badness from 
within a life, there remains some extra goodness from life itself. Imagine a scale that 
weighs life’s goods against its bads, but where the plate weighing the goods is itself 
heavier: to achieve equilibrium, the weight from the bads must exceed the weight 
from the goods. 
This paper argues that life itself is neither good nor bad. I’ll explain how any 
theory that takes life itself to be good can be formalized by specifying a function 
from length of life to the value generated by life itself. I’ll argue that every version 
of the view that life itself is good faces some version of the following dilemma: either 
(1) good human lives are worse than very long lives wholly devoid of pleasure, de-
sire-satisfaction, knowledge, or any other goods, or (2) very short lives containing 
nothing but suffering are worth living. Since neither result is plausible, we ought to 
reject the view that life itself is good. On the view I favor, any given life may be 
worth living because of the goods that it contains, but life itself is neutral. 
§2 explains what it means to say that life itself is good; §3 develops the initial 
version of my core argument, which I call the ‘Argument for Zero’; §4 develops a 
more sophisticated version of the Argument for Zero; §5 responds to various ways 
of resisting my arguments; and §6 discusses implications for other ethical issues. 
 
§2 The Positive Theory 
For any life, we can ask how good or bad that life is, whether that life is 
worth living, and whether that life is better or worse than some other life. These 
questions concern what I’ll call the global value of a life. I’ll assume that a life is worth 





living just in case its global value is above zero, and that global value is the sum of 
two quantities: (1) the value due to the character of the life, and (2) the value due to 
life itself. In §4, I’ll discuss views that deny the preceding claims. 
The value due to the character of a life is the total value from the goods (and 
bads) that are contained within the life. By a good, I just mean something that makes 
a life intrinsically better (and by a bad, something that makes a life intrinsically 
worse). Which things are good will depend on one’s preferred theory of welfare, but 
common candidates include pleasure, desire-satisfaction, and knowledge. Though 
my focus is on the value due to the entire set of goods and bads within a life (rather 
than any particular good or bad), I’ll remain largely neutral on questions about how 
the values of individual goods aggregate (such as whether the value generated by a 
set of goods is the sum of the values generated by those goods individually). 
The value due to life itself is the focus of this paper.1 The positive theory, which 
is the view I sketched at the beginning, holds that the value due to life itself is posi-
tive.2 If the positive theory is correct, then the set of goods contained within a life is 
a proper subset of the set of all goods that contribute to the global value of that life 
(since life itself belongs to the latter, but not the former). The neutral theory, which is 
the view that I endorse, holds that the value due to life itself is zero. If the neutral 
theory is correct, then any particular life may be valuable or disvaluable due to its 
character, but life itself contributes no additional value. There is also the negative 
theory, which takes the value due to life itself to be negative, but I’ll assume that such 
a theory is a non-starter. I’ll use the phrase ‘value of life’ to denote the value due to 
life itself (rather than to denote the global value of a life), though in contexts that risk 
ambiguity I’ll include ‘itself’ in the phrase. 
 
1 Kagan [2012: 259] says: “If life per se has some positive value, then to decide how well off 
someone is you can’t just add up the contents of their life…[W]e also have to add in some-
thing extra…the value in and of itself of being alive. So first we get the content subtotal, and 
then we add some extra positive points for the very fact that you are alive at all.” 
2 For endorsements of the positive theory, see Brentano [1876/1973: 119], Nagel [1970], Schu-
macher [2010: 204], and Kriegel [2019]. For further discussions of this issue, see Kagan 
[2012, Ch.12] and Rantanen [2012]. For endorsements of the claim that life is intrinsically val-
uable, see Frankena [1973], Lamb [1998: 45], Agar [2001], Link [2013]. For some prior argu-
ments against the positive theory, see Glover [2006] and Lee [2018]. 





These questions about the values of lives are fundamentally questions about 
welfare.3 To have a life is to be a welfare subject, or the kind of thing that can be 
doing well or badly. The global value of a life is the total welfare generated by that 
life. The value due to the character of a life is the value due to the welfare goods and 
bads within that life. And if life is worth living for its own sake, then life itself is a 
welfare good. Speaking metaphorically, the focus of this paper is on whether the 
“container” of welfare goods is itself a welfare good. For the purposes of this paper, 
I’ll assume welfare invariabilism, the claim that the same theory of welfare goods is 
true of every welfare subject.4 There are analogues of my arguments that target var-
iabilist views, but assuming invariabilism will simplify the discussion. 
When I talk about value, I’ll always mean value that is intrinsic (as opposed 
to instrumental), pro-tanto (in that it’s defeasible), and personal (in that it’s for an in-
dividual). I’ll treat ‘goodness’ as synonymous with ‘positive value’ and ‘badness’ as 
synonymous with ‘negative value’. My arguments are neutral on most questions 
about the nature of value. But I’ll take for granted that the values of lives can be 
represented by real numbers (where zero marks the threshold for a life worth liv-
ing), and that for any two lives L1 and L2, either L1 is better than L2 or L2 is better than 
L2 or they are equally good. These assumptions are harmless, for they are also 
needed by the positive theorist—at least if the positive theorist accepts the main 
 
2.1 The Bad-Life-Worth-Living Intuition 
Consider the following life: 
 
————— 
BAD LIFE: A life of normal length whose average quality is negative. 
————— 
 
Let the average quality of a life L be the value due to the character of L divided 
by the length of L. Average quality depends only on the value due to the character 
of a life (and not on any value from life itself). By contrast, let the average value of a 
life L be the global value of L divided by the length of L. If life itself is good, then 
 
3 See Frankena [1973] for a list of candidate welfare goods (where life is an item on the list). 
4 See Lin [2018] for a defense of welfare invariabilism. 





average quality comes apart from average value, since life itself generates value be-
yond the value generated by the goods and bads that it contains. But if life itself is 
neutral, then average quality and average value are equivalent. 
Let the bad-life-worth-living intuition be the intuition that some version of BAD 
LIFE is worth living.5 The explanation offered by those who endorse this intuition is 
that there is some goodness from life itself that offsets the net badness from within 
BAD LIFE. If that is correct, then even though the average quality of BAD LIFE is nega-
tive, its global value may still be positive. The additional value comes from life itself. 
The bad-life-worth-living intuition has been explicitly endorsed by a num-
ber of authors, and I’ll assume that it’s the core motivation for the positive theory. 
Some, such as Kriegel [2019], claim only that a life of moderately bad quality would 
be worth living. Others, such as Nagel [1970], say that even a life of very bad quality 
would be worth living. And some, such as Schumacher [2010], suggest that just 
about any life, no matter how terrible its quality, would be worth living.6 For our 
purposes, it won’t matter how exactly we imagine the character of BAD LIFE. Let’s 
just stipulate that the average value of BAD LIFE is barely positive by the lights of the 
positive theorist. Then the positive theorist affirms (while the neutral theorist de-
nies) that BAD LIFE is worth living. 
 
§3 The Argument for Zero 
To develop my argument, let me first define several kinds of lives: 
 
An excellent life:   A life with an average quality very far above zero. 
An awful life:   A life with an average quality very far below zero. 
An empty life:   A life devoid of any goods or bads (except for life itself). 
 
 
5 Kagan [2012: 260] says: “[T]he main reason for…accepting a [positive] theory is precisely to 
remind us that in deciding whether you are better off dead…it may not be sufficient to focus 
on the contents of the life; it may be important to add some positive points above and beyond 
the content subtotal so as to take into account the value of the sheer fact that you’re alive.” 
6 Rasmussen & Bailey [2021] argue that persons have infinite value. Although they distin-
guish their thesis from the claim that the lives of persons have infinite value, I think a version 
of my arguments will apply to their view about the values of persons. 





To imagine an excellent life, think of the best things from your own life and 
imagine a life filled with things that are even better. To imagine an awful life, think 
of the worst things from your own life and imagine a life filled with things that are 
even worse. To imagine an empty life, imagine a life comprised of nothing but neu-
tral experiences of gray, with no pleasures (nor pains), no desires, no knowledge or 
friendship, and nothing else from a standard list of welfare goods (and bads). Now 
consider the following lives: 
 
—————— 
PARADISE: An excellent life of normal length. 
ETERNITY:  An empty life that lasts indefinitely. 
SWIFT HELL: An awful life that lasts one minute. 
—————— 
 
With these lives defined, I can present my initial argument: 
 
⊤	 The Basic Argument for Zero 
P1:  PARADISE is better than ETERNITY. 
P2:  SWIFT HELL is not worth living. 
P3:  If life itself is valuable, then either P1 or P2 is false. 
— 
C:  Life itself is not valuable. 
 
The argument is valid. Both P1 and P2 are highly plausible. The remaining 
premise is P3, which will require several stages of argument to develop and defend. 
Before moving forward, let me make two preemptive remarks. First, my ar-
guments appeal to a number of equations and functions, which I use to formalize 
different positive theories. These formalizations may initially strike some readers as 
unnecessary for a philosophical analysis. But the formalizations will eventually 
yield philosophical fruits: in particular, they play an essential role in my argument 
for why every version of the positive theory yields counterintuitive results. Second, 
some of my arguments appeal to infinitely long lives or infinitary values. I formulate 
the arguments in this way because doing so simplifies the exposition. But for those 





who dislike the idea of infinitary lives, it’s possible to develop versions of my argu-
ments that appeal only to finite lengths and finite values. 
 
3.1 The Argument from Eternity 
Any positive theorist must answer the following question: how does the 
value of life relate to the length of life? A natural answer is that more life means 
more value: the longer a life, the greater the value generated by life itself. This leads 
to the simplest and most straightforward version of the positive theory: 
 
Linear: 
The value of life increases linearly as a function of the length of life. 
 
We can formalize Linear with a simple equation relating the length of life to 
the value of life itself. To construct this equation, let me first introduce two func-
tions—λ and τ—that will recur many times throughout this paper: 
 
λ(L) = the value of life itself for L 
τ(L) = the length of life L (in years) 
 
λ takes as input a life and outputs the value generated for it by life itself. τ 
takes as input a life and outputs the length of that life. The only other element 
needed to specify the equation for Linear is a constant 𝑎, which provides a way of 
differentiating theories that accept Linear but that vary on how they scale the value 
of life itself relative to the length of life: 
 
λ(L) = 𝑎	×	τ(L)	
The Linear Equation 
 
In the graph for the linear equation, 𝑎 specifies the slope of the line:  
 







Now, Linear seems like the obvious way of precisifying the positive theory. 
But it leads to the Argument from Eternity: 
 
⊥ The Argument from Eternity 
P1:  ETERNITY has infinite value. 
P2:  PARADISE has finite value. 
— 
C:  ETERNITY is better than PARADISE. 
 
 The reasoning is straightforward. According to Linear, the value of life itself 
for any life L is the length of L times the constant 𝑎. Since any positive real number 
times infinity is infinity, ETERNITY is guaranteed to generate infinite value from life 
itself. Since ETERNITY contains no bads, there is nothing to offset the goodness from 
life itself. By contrast, given that PARADISE is only finitely long, it’s plausible that the 
global value of PARADISE is finite. So, Linear leads to the conclusion that ETERNITY is 
better than PARADISE. But that is the wrong result: PARADISE is better than ETERNITY. 
Therefore, we must reject one of the premises in the Argument from Eternity: in 
particular, we should reject P1, which entails rejecting Linear. 7 
 
7 Crisp [1997] invokes a structurally similar point when he asks whether hedonists can avoid 
the result that for any finitely long excellent life, there is an arbitrarily long life involving only 
small, simple pleasures that is better. Note, however, that while nearly everyone accepts that 


















 Some positive theorists may initially be tempted to embrace the result that 
ETERNITY is better than PARADISE. But notice that the Argument from Eternity works 
even when we compare ETERNITY to lives that are not only excellent, but also ex-
tremely long. Consider, for example, LONG PARADISE, whose average quality is just 
as excellent as that of PARADISE but which lasts 999,999,999,999,999 years. Anyone 
who accepts Linear must likewise accept that ETERNITY is better than LONG PARADISE. 
But I suspect very few will be satisfied with this result. 
 The Argument from Eternity bears some superficial similarities to the Re-
pugnant Conclusion, the thesis that for any world A containing a finite number of 
excellent lives, there is another world Z containing a greater number of lives barely 
worth living such that Z is better than A. However, it would be a mistake to think 
that the Argument from Eternity is simply a repackaged version of the Repugnant 
Conclusion. In response to the Repugnant Conclusion, one cannot reject the stipula-
tion that each person in Z has a life barely worth living (since that is simply how the 
scenario is defined). By contrast, in response to the Argument from Eternity, one can 
reject the supposition that the average value of ETERNITY is positive (since that is 
precisely the premise that the neutral theorist denies). The Repugnant Conclusion 
generates a feeling of paradox (because it’s unobvious which premise ought to be 
rejected); the Argument from Eternity does not (because it’s obvious where the ar-
gument goes wrong). This means that the positive theorist cannot defend their view 
simply by appeal to the fact that there are seemingly similar puzzles in population 
ethics: the dialectical structures diverge.8 
 
3.2 The Argument from Hell 
To escape the Argument from Eternity, the positive theorist must reject Lin-
ear (and more generally, any theory that takes the value of life to increase without 
bound as a function of length of life). Here’s a natural alternative: 
 
 
an oyster can be better than an excellent human life, and even fewer will think that ETERNITY 
is better than PARADISE. 
8 These points apply to the intrapersonal version of the Repugnant Conclusion as well. More-
over, many responses to the Repugnant Conclusion (such as revising the notion of a life 
worth living, rejecting the transitivity of better-than, and appealing to person-affecting prin-
ciples) have no obvious analogues as responses to the Argument from Eternity. 






The value of life is all-or-nothing. 
 
According to All-or-Nothing, every life generates the same amount of value 
from life itself, regardless of its length. This view is formalized by the following 
equation (where 𝑏 is the all-or-nothing value of life itself): 
 
λ(L) = 𝑏 
The All-or-Nothing Equation 
 




All-or-Nothing avoids the Argument from Eternity (so long as 𝑏 is finite). But 
now a new issue arises: the bad-life-worth-living intuition must be restricted. Since 
there is no limit on how long BAD LIFE might last, there is arguably no limit on how 
much badness BAD LIFE might generate. This means that rejecting Linear requires 
taking the bad-life-worth-living intuition to have a limited scope, where not all bad 
lives are worth living, even if we hold fixed their average quality. That result is sig-
nificant, since it’s natural to interpret the bad-life-worth-living intuition as a re-
stricted universal claim, scoping over all lives whose average qualities are greater 
than or equal to that of BAD LIFE. 
 The positive theorist might counter that the bad-life-worth-living intuition 
is intended to hold only at the scale of human lives. After all, those who have en-
dorsed the intuition were probably not thinking about lives of arbitrary length and 





character. And in any case, much of the interest of the positive theory comes from 
its implications for the values of our own lives. But if we restrict the bad-life-worth-
living intuition, then we can ask: how much value must life itself have in order to 
satisfy the bad-life-worth-living intuition for normal human lives? 
According to a recent report by the United Nations, the life expectancy for a 
person born in 2020 is about 73 years.9 Suppose we accept both All-or-Nothing and 
the bad-life-worth-living intuition. Then, to grasp the magnitude of the value of life, 
we need to appreciate the accumulation of goods and bads over the course of a 
whole lifetime (rather than merely the goodness or badness associated with a mo-
ment in life). Even if the average quality of BAD LIFE is only mildly negative, the all-
or-nothing value of life itself would have to be extremely high in order to offset the 
net badness from a 73-year-long life of negative average quality. 
Some might point out that even a life that is barely negative in its global 
value (as opposed to merely its average quality) would still count as a version of 
BAD LIFE. But while this point is technically correct, I think it’s irrelevant in the pre-
sent context. When a positive theorist thinks about BAD LIFE, they aren’t thinking of 
a life where just one extra pinprick would tip the scale and render the life no longer 
worth living. Instead, the motivation for the positive theory likely comes from think-
ing of a moment in life that is hypothesized to be negative in quality, supposing that 
this level of quality reflects the average quality of the whole life, and judging that 
such a life would nevertheless be worth living. But then, by the reasoning above, 
any positive theorist who endorses All-or-Nothing must take life itself to have an 
enormous amount of value. 
At first, this may appear to be good news for the positive theorist. Now they 
can deny that ETERNITY is better than PARADISE yet still accept that BAD LIFE is worth 
living. However, the escape from ETERNITY leads straight to SWIFT HELL: 
 
————— 




9 See United Nations, Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division [2019]. 





 How terrible is SWIFT HELL? Let’s stipulate that the value due to the character 
of SWIFT HELL is – 𝑏 + 𝜖, where 𝜖 is some very small positive number. In other words, 
we define SWIFT HELL to be about as awful as it can be while still having its badness 
outweighed by the goodness from life itself. Speaking metaphorically, we can think 
of SWIFT HELL as the result of taking the net badness of BAD LIFE and condensing that 
into a single minute. To put that into perspective, the average quality of SWIFT HELL 
is a little less than 38,368,800 times as negative as the average quality of BAD LIFE.10 
Therefore, even if the average quality of BAD LIFE is only mildly negative, SWIFT HELL 
must be unimaginably horrendous. 
Now we are ready for the Argument from Hell: 
 
⊥ The Argument from Hell 
P1:  The value due to life itself for SWIFT HELL is 𝑏. 
P2:  The value due to the character of SWIFT HELL is – 𝑏 + 𝜖 (where 𝜖 > 0). 
P3:  𝑏 is positive. 
— 
C:  SWIFT HELL is a life worth living. 
 
The reasoning is straightforward. By All-or-Nothing, the value from life itself 
is b. By stipulation, the value due to the character of SWIFT HELL is – 𝑏 + 𝜖, where 𝜖 is 
some small positive number. By the positive theory, 𝑏	is positive. And by the rea-
soning from earlier, SWIFT HELL is unimaginably horrific. So, All-or-Nothing leads to 
the result that a very brief life containing nothing but terrible suffering is worth liv-
ing. But that is the wrong result: SWIFT HELL is not worth living. Therefore, we must 
reject one of the premises. Since P3 is the positive theory itself and P2 is a stipulation, 
the only option for the positive theorist is to reject P1, which is tantamount to reject-
ing All-or-Nothing. 
I’ve now argued that Linear leads to the Argument from Eternity and that 
All-or-Nothing leads to the Argument from Hell. This establishes the core of my ar-
gument against the positive theory. 
 
 
10 SWIFT HELL lasts one minute, BAD LIFE lasts 73 years, and there are 525,600 minutes in a year. 
525,600 × 73 = 38,368,800. 





§4 The Argument against Asymptote 
It’s possible for a positive theorist to accept both (1) that the value of life 
increases as a function of the length of life (as with Linear) and (2) that the value of 




The value of life increases asymptotically with the length of life. 
 
According to Asymptote, as a life grows arbitrarily long, the value generated 
by life itself approaches an upper bound, which I’ll label 𝑐. We also need to define a 
new constant, 𝑛, which specifies how quickly the value of life approaches that upper 
bound (or, equivalently, the rate at which the marginal value of life itself shrinks). 
More precisely, let 𝑛 mark how long a life must be in order to generate half of 𝑐: 
 
𝑐 the maximal value that can be generated by life itself 
𝑛 the length of life that generates half of 𝑐 
 






The Asymptote Equation 
 
In the graph for the asymptote equation, 𝑐	specifies the line’s vertical limit and 𝑛 
specifies the line’s curvature: 
 
 
11 There are other ways of constructing an asymptotic function, but this is the simplest ver-
sion that is both monotonically increasing and where 𝑓(𝑥) > 0 whenever 𝑥 > 0. 







Here’s a striking feature of the asymptote equation: the higher the value of 
𝑛, the more it behaves like the linear equation, while the lower the value of 𝑛, the 
more it behaves like the all-or-nothing equation. In other words, as 𝑛 tends to infin-
ity, the asymptote graph looks more and more like the linear graph, whereas as 𝑛 
tends to zero, the asymptote graph looks more and more like the all-or-nothing 
graph. This observation will be important for my ensuing argument. 
With Asymptote, the positive theorist can avoid both the Argument from 
Eternity (since there is an upper bound on the value of life itself) and the Argument 
from Hell (since life itself yields very little value after only a minute). Moreover, 
Asymptote satisfies the bad-life-worth-living intuition (since life itself has positive 
value), as well as the intuition that more life means more value (since greater lengths 
of life always entail greater value from life itself). Therefore, Asymptote initially ap-
pears to provide an escape from the Argument for Zero. But unfortunately (for the 
positive theorist), the appearance of escape is illusory. 
Here’s the basic quandary. To avoid analogues of the Argument from Eter-
nity, one must ensure that 𝑛 is not too high (or else ETERNITY will be better than a 
good human life). To avoid analogues of the Argument from Hell, one must ensure 
that 𝑛 is not too low (or else SWIFT HELL will be worth living). I’ll argue that the ten-
sion between these constraints cannot be resolved: every value of 𝑛 yields implau-




















4.1 The Setup 
To set the stage for the Argument against Asymptote, we need a new func-
tion, γ, which takes as input a life and outputs the value due to the character of that 
life. Here again are all three of the functions we have defined: 
 
λ(L) = value of life itself for L 
τ(L) = length of L (in years) 
γ(L) = value due to character of L 
 
Now let’s define two new lives—GOOD LIFE and SHORT HELL—which are var-
iants of PARADISE and SWIFT HELL.12 In addition, we will once again appeal to ETER-
NITY and BAD LIFE. All of these lives are characterized below (as before, let 𝜖 be a 
small positive number): 
  
————— 
ETERNITY:  An empty life that lasts indefinitely. 
γ(ETERNITY) = 0 and λ(ETERNITY) = c 
 
BAD LIFE: A bad life that lasts for 73 years. 
γ(BAD LIFE) + λ(BAD LIFE) = 𝜖 
 
GOOD LIFE: A good life that lasts for 73 years. 
γ(GOOD LIFE) = – γ(BAD LIFE) 
 
SHORT HELL: An awful life that lasts for 1 year. 




12 It’s possible to develop the Argument against Asymptote using PARADISE and SWIFT HELL, 
but the argument is simpler and sharper if we instead appeal to GOOD LIFE and SHORT HELL. 
It’s likewise possible to develop the whole Argument for Zero using only GOOD LIFE and 
SHORT HELL, but appealing to PARADISE and SWIFT HELL better elicits the force of the Argu-
ments from Eternity and Hell. 





Here’s an overview of the formal claims stated above: (1) ETERNITY is a life 
that contains no goods or bads but generates the maximal value from life itself. (2) 
BAD LIFE is a life with a negative average quality but (according to the positive theo-
rist) a positive average value. (3) GOOD LIFE is a life where the positive value due to 
its character is the opposite of the negative value due to the character of BAD LIFE. (4) 
SHORT HELL is a stretched-out version of SWIFT HELL (or a compressed version of BAD 
LIFE), and is nearly as awful as it can be while still (according to the positive theorist) 
being worth living. 
Now we are ready for the Argument against Asymptote. Recall that the as-
ymptote equation contains a constant n, which specifies the length of life that gen-
erates half of the maximal value of life itself. I’ll argue that (1) the greater the value 
of 𝑛, the more implausible the results become concerning ETERNITY, (2) the lower the 
value of 𝑛, the more implausible the results become concerning SHORT HELL, and (3) 
there is a middle value of 𝑛 that yields implausible results for both ETERNITY and 
SHORT HELL. The result is that every value of 𝑛 yields implausible results. 
 
4.2 The Upward Argument 
To begin, consider what happens as 𝑛 becomes very large. The greater the 
value of 𝑛, the smaller the ratio between (a) the value of life itself for a life of any 
given finite length and (b) the maximal value of life itself. As 𝑛 tends to infinity, the 
ratio between a and b approaches zero. Since the bad-life-worth-living intuition says 
that some 73-year-long bad human lives are worth living, we can think of the value 
of life itself at 𝑛 = 73 as a fixed point (where the greater the value of 𝑛, the larger the 
maximal value of life relative to the value of life itself for a 73-year-long life). This 
means that the greater the value of 𝑛, the greater the value of ETERNITY. As 𝑛 tends 






4.3 The Downward Argument 
Next, consider what happens as 𝑛 becomes very small. The smaller the value 
of 𝑛, the larger the ratio between (a) the value of life itself for a life of any given finite 
length and (b) the maximal value of life itself. As 𝑛 tends to zero, the ratio between 





a and b approaches 1. In other words, when 𝑛 is very small, even very short lives 
will generate nearly the maximal value from life itself. Now, recall that γ(SHORT 
HELL) + λ(SHORT HELL) = 𝜖, meaning that the badness due to the character of SHORT 
HELL is barely outweighed by the value of life itself for SHORT HELL. This means that 
the smaller the value of 𝑛, the worse the average quality of SHORT HELL. As 𝑛 tends 






4.4 The Unstable Middle Argument 
We have established that Asymptote encounters problems if 𝑛 is either very 
large or very small. But is there a golden middle range that avoids implausible re-
sults in either direction? Suppose we set 𝑛 = 73, meaning that a 73-year-long life 
would generate half of the maximal value of life. I’ll argue that if 𝑛 = 73, then we get 
implausible results concerning both ETERNITY and SHORT HELL. Then, given the Up-
ward Argument and the Downward Argument, it will follow that no value of 𝑛 
avoids implausible results. 
To develop this stage of the argument, it’s helpful to lay out the results for 
ETERNITY, BAD LIFE, GOOD LIFE, and SHORT HELL when we apply to those lives the 
functions τ (which specifies the length of life in years), λ (which specifies the value 
of life itself according to Asymptote, with 𝑛 set to 73), and γ (which specifies the value 
due to the character of life). Here are those results: 
 
Length of Life Value due to Life Itself Value due to Character of Life 
τ(ETERNITY) = ∞ λ(ETERNITY) = 𝑐 γ(ETERNITY) = 0 
τ(BAD LIFE) = 73 λ(BAD LIFE) = !"	𝑐 γ(BAD LIFE) = –
!
"	𝑐 + 	𝜖 
τ(GOOD LIFE) = 73 λ(GOOD LIFE) = !"	𝑐 γ(GOOD LIFE) = 
!
"	𝑐 – 𝜖 









These results, I’ll argue, are unacceptable.13 
First, consider ETERNITY and GOOD LIFE. Recall that global value is the sum 
of the value due to the character of life and the value of life itself: formally, global 
value(L) = λ(L) + γ(L). The results above show that if 𝑛 = 73, then the global value of 
ETERNITY is slightly greater than the global value of GOOD LIFE. In particular, the 
global value of ETERNITY is c whereas the global value of GOOD LIFE is 𝑐 – 𝜖. However, 
it’s implausible that ETERNITY is better than GOOD LIFE. If you could choose which 
life to live, GOOD LIFE would be vastly preferable to ETERNITY. Therefore, if 𝑛 = 73, 
we have an implausible result concerning ETERNITY. 
 Second, consider SHORT HELL and BAD LIFE. Recall that average quality is the 
value due to the character of life divided by length of life: formally, average quality(L) 
= γ(L) ÷ τ(L). The results above show that if 𝑛	= 73, then the average quality of SHORT 
HELL is nearly twice as negative as the average quality of BAD LIFE. In particular, if 
we factor out the negligible value associated with the ϵ term, then the average qual-
ity of SHORT HELL is – !#$	𝑐 whereas the average quality of BAD LIFE is –
!
!$%	𝑐. Yet the 
positive theorist is forced to say that SHORT HELL is worth living, since we stipulated 
that the badness due to the character of SHORT HELL is outweighed by the value of 
life itself for SHORT HELL. However, it’s implausible that a very short life whose av-
erage quality is much worse than that of BAD LIFE is worth living. Therefore, if 𝑛 = 73, 
we have an implausible result concerning SHORT HELL. 
 To summarize: Anyone who accepts Asymptote must specify a value for 𝑛, 
which marks how long a life must be in order to generate half the maximal value 
from life itself. The Upward Argument showed that if we increase the value of 𝑛, 
then the predictions about ETERNITY grow more implausible. The Downward Argu-
ment showed that if we decrease the value of 𝑛, then the predictions about SHORT 
HELL grow more implausible. The Unstable Middle Argument showed that if 𝑛 = 73, 
then we get the implausible results that (1) ETERNITY is better than GOOD LIFE, and 
(2) SHORT HELL is worth living. Therefore, every value of 𝑛 yields implausible re-
sults. So, we ought to reject Asymptote. 
 
13 Most of these results are straightforward to verify. To see that λ(SHORT HELL) =  !"#	𝑐, note 
that λ(SHORT HELL) = c  × τ(!"#$% "&'') 
τ(!"#$% "&'') + 𝑛
=  c  × 1 
$ + %&
=  c  
%'
 =  1  
%'
𝑐. To see that γ(SHORT HELL) =  1  
!"
𝑐 + ϵ, 
recall that γ(SHORT HELL) + λ(SHORT HELL) = 𝜖. Since λ(SHORT HELL) = 1  
%'
𝑐, we can solve for 
γ(SHORT HELL), yielding the result that γ(SHORT HELL) = 1  
!"
𝑐 + ϵ. 






4.5 The Argument for Zero 
 Here’s a natural question: if the positive theorist already takes BAD LIFE to be 
worth living, then why couldn’t they likewise think that SHORT HELL would also be 
worth living? Well, remember that we defined BAD LIFE to be as bad as it could pos-
sibly be while still being worth living by the lights of the positive theorist. Yet what-
ever BAD LIFE looks like, SHORT HELL is approximately twice as bad with respect to 
average quality and much shorter with respect to length. This means that if the pos-
itive theorist accepts Asymptote, then for whatever kind of life they initially think has 
an average quality that renders it barely worth living, there are shorter lives with 
worse average qualities that are also worth living. I think nearly everyone will find 
this result unappealing. 
In fact, for similar reasons, Asymptote generates the result that some lives 
with better average qualities and longer lengths than BAD LIFE are not worth living. 
Let LONG BAD LIFE be a life lasting 100,000 years with an average quality slightly 
better than the average quality of BAD LIFE (though still negative). Since LONG BAD 
LIFE is much longer than BAD LIFE, the badness from the character of the former will 
be many times greater than the badness from the character of the latter. But given 
Asymptote (with 𝑛 = 73), the value from life itself for LONG BAD LIFE will be less than 
twice the value from life itself for BAD LIFE. This means that Asymptote entails that 
LONG BAD LIFE isn’t worth living, despite the fact that it has a better quality and 
longer length than BAD LIFE. I suspect few positive theorists will be satisfied with 
this result. 
There are, of course, infinitely many other functions from length of life to 
value of life. But I cannot think of any other functions that are credible candidates 
for constructing a positive theory.14 And given my arguments, it’s reasonable to 
think that every version of the positive theory will be vulnerable to some version of 
 
14 Some might wish to appeal to the idea that the function from length of life to value of life 
is a sigmoid curve, where (a) very short lives generate little value from life, (b) normal-length 
lives generate a lot of value from life, and (c) extremely long lives generate only slightly more 
value from life than normal-length lives. For limits of space, I won’t be able to address this 
view. But in brief, such a view leads to either (1) the conclusion that LONG BAD LIFE is not 
worth living, or (2) a version of the original dilemma, concerning ETERNITY and SHORT HELL. 





the Argument for Zero. The source of the problem lies not with the particular func-
tions we have considered, but instead with the positive theory itself. 
Here’s the upshot: Linear leads to the Argument from Eternity, All-or-Noth-
ing leads to the Argument from Hell, Asymptote leads to a version of either (or both), 
and other versions of the positive theory seem susceptible to the same dilemma. 
Now I can state a generalized version of the Argument for Zero: 
 
⊤ The Generalized Argument for Zero 
P1:  GOOD LIFE is better than ETERNITY. 
P2:  SHORT HELL is not worth living. 
P3:  If life itself is valuable, then either P1 or P2 is false. 
— 
C:  Life itself is not valuable. 
 
§5 Arguments against Alternatives 
 Let’s now turn to some other options for resisting the Argument for Zero. 
 
5.1 Option 1: Positivity 
I’ve assumed that the only factor relevant to determining the value of life 
itself is quantity of life. But what if the positive theorist instead appeals to some other 
factor? Some may be tempted to appeal to a principle like Diversity, according to 
which the value of life increases as a function of its diversity of experiences. On this 
view, the value of life depends in part on how rich and variegated a life is. ETERNITY 
contains only a single kind of experience and SHORT HELL contains nothing but suf-
fering. These lives lack the texture and flavor that characterize normal human lives. 
By contrast, even though BAD LIFE has a negative average quality, it might still be 
diverse enough to yield plenty of value from life itself. 
The problem is that Diversity leads to new kinds of counterintuitive results. 
Let DIVERSE HELL be a life filled with an extremely diverse set of experiences, all of 
which are bad. Though DIVERSE HELL contains no good experiences, it still contains 
a rich variety of experiences: pain, hunger, thirst, anger, sadness, anxiety, frustra-
tion, disgust, horror, nausea, itchiness, and so on. DIVERSE HELL involves suffering 
in as many ways as you can imagine and in many more ways you cannot imagine. 
If Diversity were true, then DIVERSE HELL may well be worth living, so long as the 





intensity of each bad experience were sufficiently mild. But DIVERSE HELL is obvi-
ously not worth living, so we should reject Diversity. 
 This pattern of argument generalizes. If the value of life is taken to be a func-
tion of some quantity besides length of life, then we can always generate analogues 
of the Argument for Zero by considering lives that score high on that quantity yet 
are filled with bads. The only way to avoid that result would be to take the value of 




The value of life increases as a function of the amount of goods within it. 
 
Positivity predicts that both DIVERSE HELL and SHORT HELL are not worth liv-
ing (since they contain no goods), that the value of ETERNITY is zero (since it contains 
no goods), and yet that BAD LIFE may nevertheless be worth living (since it may still 
contain many goods). Since Positivity entails that an increase in the bads within a life 
will always yield a net decrease in the global value of that life, the principle is im-
mune to the kind of argument that all the other principles have been vulnerable to. 
 Nevertheless, I think there is a deeper problem with Positivity. We began 
this paper with the view that life itself is good, meaning that any life acquires some 
goodness from life itself, regardless of its character. But Positivity says instead that 
some lives generate no goodness at all, and that the goodness from life itself is de-
termined by (rather than independent from) its character. That is quite a departure 
from the view we started with. If x is good, then it’s natural to think that the amount 
of goodness from x must be a function of the amount of x. But Positivity says that 
even though it’s x that is good, it’s only more of y that generates more goodness 
from x. As an analogy, imagine someone who claims that belief is valuable, but who 
says that the value of belief itself is defeated whenever a belief is false, unjustified, 
unsafe, or otherwise does not amount to knowledge. That seems suspicious: if be-
liefs generate value when and only when they amount to knowledge, then why at-
tribute the value to belief (rather than to knowledge)? Similarly, if quantity of life 
has no direct correlation with the amount of value generated by life itself, then why 
attribute the value to life itself, rather than to whatever serves at the scaling factor? 
 





5.2 Option 2: Inferiority 
Let’s say good 𝑔1 is inferior to good 𝑔2 (or bad 𝑏1) just in case any amount of 
𝑔1 is worse than (or outweighed by) any amount of 𝑔2 (or 𝑏1).15 And let’s say 𝑔1 is 




Life itself is inferior to every good and bad within life. 
 
If Inferiority is true, then GOOD LIFE is better than ETERNITY (since ETERNITY’s 
only good is life itself, which is inferior to the goods within GOOD LIFE) and neither 
SHORT HELL nor DIVERSE HELL is worth living (since life itself is inferior to the bads 
within those lives). However, this apparent solution brings about a new problem: 
Inferiority cannot retain the bad-life-worth-living intuition. If life itself is inferior to 
any bad within life, then no version of BAD LIFE is worth living. In fact, Inferiority 
predicts that even a single pinprick can outweigh any value accrued from life itself. 
Only balanced lives, where the goods (within the life) exactly counterweigh the bads, 
lead to divergent predictions between Inferiority and the neutral theory: Inferiority 
takes balanced lives to be barely above (rather than exactly on) the threshold of be-
ing worth living. For any other life, the value due to life itself may as well be zero. 
This strikes me as tantamount to giving up on the positive theory. 
What if the positive theorist contends that life itself is inferior to only some 
(rather than all) goods and bads within life? This weakening would enable the pos-
itive theorist to retain a form of the bad-life-worth-living intuition, but it no longer 
renders the positive theory immune to the Argument for Zero. If some goods are 
comparable to life itself, then we could consider a version of GOOD LIFE containing 
only those kinds of goods in order to generate the result that ETERNITY is better than 
GOOD LIFE. Or if some bads are comparable to life itself, then we could consider a 
version of SHORT HELL containing only those kinds of bads in order to generate the 
result that SHORT HELL is worth living. As soon as the positive theorist weakens In-
feriority, the Argument for Zero returns. 
 
15 See Arrhenius & Rabinowicz [2015] for a recent discussion of inferiority principles. 





At this point, some may be tempted to simply contend that the value due to 
life itself is incommensurable with the value due to the character of life. Perhaps 
there are two distinct dimensions of value and no objective fact of the matter about 
how to compare the two dimensions. However, while rejecting commensurability 
nullifies the Argument for Zero, it also nullifies the bad-life-worth-living intuition. 
In order to accept incommensurability, one must give up the intuition that motivates 
the positive theory in the first place. Moreover, the positive theorist cannot retreat 
to the idea that life is worth living so long as one’s life has a positive value along at 
least one of the two dimensions, for that would mean that lives such as SWIFT HELL 
(as well as lives that are much worse) are worth living. 
Finally, the positive theorist might point out that the results from the Argu-
ment for Zero are less counterintuitive if we take the value of life itself to be ex-
tremely small. But softening the blow of the counterintuitive results likewise saps 
the interest from the positive theory itself. We began this paper with a philosophi-
cally provocative picture, where even a life where the bads are plentiful and the 
goods are scarce would be worth living because of the extra goodness from life itself. 
That picture gradually dissolves as the value of life gradually fades to nothing. 
 
5.3 Option 3: Anti-Globalism 
My arguments have assumed the following principle: 
 
Globalism: 
Life L1 is better than life L2 just in case global value(L1) > global value(L2). 
 
I defined global value as the sum of (1) the value due to the character of a 
life, and (2) the value due to life itself. But one might contend that there are other 
facts that determine whether one life is better or worse than another. Consider, for 
example, the idea that a life that gets better over time is better (all else equal) than a 
life that gets worse over time, even if both lives contain exactly the same set of goods 
and bads. At first, it may seem that these sorts of factors are excluded by Globalism. 
However, while the paradigms of the goods within life are atomistic goods like 
pleasure, desire-satisfaction, and knowledge, none of my remarks preclude holistic 
factors such as shape of life from contributing to the value due to the character of a 
life. The only stipulation I’ve made is that the value due to the character of life 





excludes any value from life itself. This means my arguments are compatible with a 
variety of views about which factors make lives better or worse. 
A second approach is to appeal to average values instead of global values. 
Recall that the average value of a life is the global value of that life divided by the 
length of that life. According to Average, life L1 is better than life L2 just in case average 
value(L1) > average value(L2). Now, Average is a principle about what makes one life 
better than another (rather than a principle about the value of life itself), but we can 
combine it with a principle like Linear to get a version of the positive theory. In fact, 
Average + Linear yields promising results: the average value of BAD LIFE is barely 
positive, the average value of ETERNITY is lower than the average value of GOOD LIFE, 
and the average value of SHORT HELL is negative. However, consider SWIFT HEAVEN, 
a life that lasts for one minute but that has an average value slightly better than the 
average value for PARADISE. Average + Linear predicts that SWIFT HEAVEN is better 
than PARADISE. But that is the wrong result: PARADISE is better than SWIFT HEAVEN. 
Therefore, we ought to reject Average + Linear. As far as I can see, other principles 
about the value of life fare no better when combined with Average.16 
A third approach is to appeal to the idea that life L1 is better than life L2 just 
in case the scaled value (rather than the global value or average value) of L1 is greater 
than that of L1. The notion of scaled value is technically complex and has been sys-
tematically discussed in Arrhenius [2000],17 so I’ll keep my discussion brief. We can 
think of scaled value as average value times scaled length, where scaled length ap-
proximates length of life for short lives but approaches a maximal bound for longer 
lives. This makes scaled value behave like global value when comparing lives of 
very short length and like average value when comparing lives of very long length.18 
 
16 The challenges for average welfare principles are familiar from the population ethics liter-
ature. See, as examples, Parfit [1984: 420] and Huemer [2008]. Note also that even those sym-
pathetic to average utilitarianism (about populations of lives) tend to still endorse Globalism 
(about individual lives). See, for example, Pressman [2015]. 
17 See also Ng [1989] and Sider [1991]. 
18 To formally define scaled value, we must first specify a constant k between 0 and 1, where 
higher values of k make scaled value closer to global value and lower values of k make scaled 
value closer to average value. We then use k to define a new function ω from lives to scaled 
lengths, where ω(L) = ∑ 𝑘#	%	&'(!)#	*	& = 𝑘+ + 𝑘& + 𝑘, +⋯+ 𝑘'
(!)%&. Then scaled value(L) = average 
value(L) × ω(L). Note that this formula is structurally identical to Ng [1989]’s Variable Value 





As a result, an appeal to scaled value can secure the results that GOOD LIFE is better 
than ETERNITY, SHORT HELL is not worth living, BAD LIFE is worth living, and SWIFT 
HEAVEN is worse than PARADISE.19 The problem, though, is that scaled value gener-
ates new counterintuitive results. These include the results that (1) for any life L, 
there is some positive average value α and some negative average value β such that 
it would be better (all else equal) for L to be extended by some small number of years 
with (negative) average value β rather than some large number of years with (posi-
tive) average value α, (2) lives that are worth living can sometimes be made worse 
just by adding years with positive average value, and (3) lives that are not worth 
living can sometimes be made better just by adding years with negative average 
value. These results make me think that an appeal to scaled value cannot save the 
positive theory. 
 
5.4 Out of Options? 
I’ve argued against a variety of approaches for resisting the Argument for 
Zero, and I cannot think of any other credible ways of developing the positive the-
ory. Given this, I believe that the Argument for Zero is sound and that the positive 
theory is false. Supposing that the negative theory is a non-starter, the only viable 
option is the neutral theory. This concludes my argument for the neutrality of life. 
 
§6 Ethical Implications 
What implications does the neutral theory have for other issues in ethics? 
A central task in ethics is to develop the correct theory of welfare. This theory 
ought to tell us, amongst other things, which things make one better or worse off. 
By arguing for the neutral theory, I’ve argued that the “container” of welfare goods 
is not itself a welfare good. A more subtle consequence concerns how we quantify 
the values of other welfare goods. I’ve argued that no version of BAD LIFE is worth 
living. But perhaps the life that the positive theorist imagines when they endorse the 
bad-life-worth-living intuition isn’t actually a life with a negative average quality. If 
 
Principle: the only difference is that Ng’s population variable has been replaced in the for-
mula above with a length of life variable. 
19 Actually, I suspect even positive theories that appeal to scaled value will face versions of 
the Argument for Zero. But I’ll set aside this worry. 





that turns out to be the case, then the positive theorist need not revise their views 
about which particular lives are worth living—instead, they need only revise their 
views about how to quantify the values of those lives. 
If we move from individual lives to populations of lives, then we encounter 
the sorts of issues addressed in population ethics. An interesting observation is that 
if the positive theory were true, then the Repugnant Conclusion would be “super-
repugnant,” since the two theses in conjunction would mean that for any finite pop-
ulation A containing only excellent lives, there is a larger population Z containing 
only lives with negative average qualities such that Z is better than A. The neutral 
theory avoids super-repugnance because it entails that whether a life is worth living 
depends only on the goods and bads within that life, meaning that only lives with 
positive average qualities are worth living. 
The neutral theory also has implications for a number of issues within ap-
plied ethics. The idea that life itself is valuable is sometimes appealed to as justifica-
tion for claims about the wrongness of euthanasia, abortion, meat-eating, murder, 
or suicide, or for claims about the goodness of procreation or life extension. The 
neutral theory doesn’t settle whether such claims are true or false, but it does con-
strain the options for arguing for such claims. Whatever one thinks about those is-
sues, one ought not appeal to the value of life itself as justification for one’s view. 
It's worth highlighting a special connection to the question of whether con-
sciousness is intrinsically valuable.20 To have a life, in the sense at stake here, is to be 
a welfare subject. This definition leaves open which things have lives, meaning what 
it is for something to be a welfare subject. But a common view is that consciousness 
is what makes an entity a welfare subject, meaning that all and only conscious enti-
ties have lives. Given such a view, the Argument for Zero likewise establishes the 
neutrality of consciousness. This paper may thus be reinterpreted as arguing that 
consciousness has zero intrinsic value (or disvalue). 
Note that my arguments about the value of life are independent from the 
issues investigated in the literatures on (a) the value of existence, and (b) the badness 
of death. The former concern whether some outcomes can be better or worse for one 
than not existing at all. The latter concern whether death can be bad for the one who 
dies, given that one no longer exists after death. These literatures focus on issues like 
 
20 See Lee [2018]. 





the non-identity problem, the puzzle of whether bringing an individual into existence 
with a life barely worth living would be wrong if the individual would not exist 
otherwise, and on views like the deprivation theory, according to which death is bad 
because of the goods that it deprives one of. While the neutral theory has implica-
tions for what counts as a life barely worth living and which goods death deprives 
one of, it leaves open which actions are permissible in non-identity scenarios and 
whether the deprivation theory is true in the first place.21 
Although I’ve argued that life is neutral, my arguments remain compatible 
with views that take life to be ethically significant in other kinds of ways. Consider, 
as examples, the ideas that (1) anything that has a life thereby has moral status, or 
(2) there is a right to life. One might think that life confers moral status not because 
life itself is good, but instead because having a life makes one a welfare subject and 
because all welfare subjects have moral status. Or one might think that one has a 
right to life not because life itself is good, but instead because life is what enables 
one to acquire goods in the first place. 
 
§7 Conclusion 
This paper has shown how different versions of the view that life itself is 
valuable can be associated with different functions from length of life to value of 
life. By formalizing the idea, we can utilize the formal structure to expose implausi-
ble consequences of the relevant views. I’ve argued that the positive theory leads to 
a dilemma: either (1) good human lives are worse than very long lives wholly de-
void of pleasure, desire-satisfaction, knowledge, or any other goods, or (2) very 
short lives containing nothing but suffering are worth living. I suspect most who 
were initially attracted to the bad-life-worth-living intuition will be reluctant to em-
brace either option. Those who still favor the positive theory must choose a horn of 
the dilemma. 
On the picture I favor, life itself is neither good nor bad. To determine how 
good a life is, or whether a life is worth living, or whether one life is better than 
 
21 There is also the question of whether existence itself is good, which is analogous to the 
question of whether life itself is good. My point is simply that the philosophical literatures 
labeled ‘value of existence’ and ‘badness of death’ tend not to focus on the kinds of issues 
addressed in this paper. 





another, we need only look at the goods and bads within that life. In other words, 
the goodness of a life is determined only by the goods and bads within a life, for life 
itself is neutral.† 
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